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Abstract:  Part of the rationale for NAFTA was that it would increase 
trade and FDI flows, creating jobs and reducing migration to the US.   
Since poor data on illegal flows to the US makes direct measurement   
difficult, this paper instead evaluates the mechanism behind these 
predictions using data on migration within Mexico where the census data 
permit careful analysis.  We offer the first specifications for migration 
within Mexico incorporating measures of cost of living, amenities and 
networks.  Contrary to much of the literature, labor market variables enter 
very significantly and as predicted once we attempt to control for 
substitutions vs. credit constraint effects. FDI and trade variables deter 
migration and appear to work through the labor market.  Finally, we 
generate some tentative inferences about the impact on Mexico-US 
migration and find it to be of important magnitude.   
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“Mexico wants to export goods, not people.” 
 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari promoted NAFTA partly on the 
grounds that it would reduce the incentives for Mexicans to migrate north.  While 
intuitively appealing, several literatures have suggested possible slips ‘twixt cup and lip.  
To offer three examples, Razin and Sadka (1997) note that dropping the assumption of 
identical production technologies or permitting increasing returns to scale allows trade 
and migration to be complements rather than substitutes.  Markusen and Zahniser (1999), 
drawing on models and empirical evidence by Feenstra and Hanson (1995) and Markusen 
and Venables (1995) suggest that the FDI and trade effects of NAFTA are likely to 
increase the relative earnings of skilled workers but not those of the unskilled workers 
who are most likely to migrate. Finally, much of the migration literature has failed to find 
a significant or intuitive impact on migration of initial location wages or unemployment 
rates (Greenwood 1997, Lucas 1997) casting some doubt on how strong any trade or FDI 
effects working through the home country labor market would be. More worrisome, there 
is increasing evidence that liquidity constraints pose a barrier to migration- it takes 
resources to move (see Stark and Taylor 1991).  If FDI or trade flows relax this 
constraint, the expected substitution effect may be partially or completely offset leading 
to greater migration.  
 
The illicit nature of Mexican-US migration flows means they are poorly measured 
and this forces us to rely on indirect approaches to the question.  A small detailed case 
study literature on individual municipalities offers some suggestive evidence that the 
NAFTA related phenomena- female manufacturing employment and proximity to a 
maquila- might reduce migration.
1  In a times series context, Hanson and Spillimbergo 
                                                 
1 Using data gathered in 25 Mexican communities, Massey and Espinosa (1997) create histories of migrants 
to the US and find initial migration to the US to be negatively related to the wage rate and the proportion of 
women in manufacturing.  Jones (2000) examines 17 emigrant municipalities and argues in favor of an 
association between proximity to maquiladoras and employment growth and, in turn, declining US 
migration.     2
(1999) find that border apprehensions are responsive to US-Mexico wage differentials, a 
finding confirmed by McKenzie and Rapoport  (2003) using a retrospective survey.     
However, in line with Markusen’s concern, we would like to know if these differentials 
were directly linked to FDI and trade.
2  Davila and Saenz (1990) find a negative 
relationship between lagged maquila employment on the border and monthly border 
apprehensions as a proxy for migration pressures.  Unfortunately, more direct trade data 
on FDI and trade are available neither at the level of periodicity or span to offer enough 
degrees of freedom to permit inference with any confidence.  Further, the massive peso 
crisis beginning roughly concomitant with the signing of NAFTA led to a sharp spike in 
unemployment and a 25% fall in wages that very likely induced flows to the US that 
complicates inference on the more modest effects of NAFTA might have had in the 
opposite direction.  
 
For these reasons, this paper focuses on evaluating the mechanisms through which 
NAFTA related variables might work, and the importance of some of the caveats 
discussed above, using data on migration flows within Mexico where the census data 
permit careful analysis and the 32 by 32 permutations offer substantial degrees of 
freedom. Figure 1 shows the rates of net migration (net flows as a fraction of the 
population in the initial period) by state and figure 2 FDI by state. A casual look suggests 
that, in fact, there is a relationship between the magnitude of FDI and migration to a 
locale. In investigating this possibility for FDI and other trade variables more rigorously, 
we make three contributions to the literature on migration more generally, and then 
specifically on the impact of trade and FDI flows on migration.  
 
First, we offer the first estimates of determinants of migration flows within 
Mexico and make some advances in the LDC migration literature.  In line with recent 
innovations in the industrialized country literature, we generate proxies for both the level 
of amenities and costs of living and find their influence to be statistically significant.  
Further, contrary to much of the literature either in the industrialized or developing world 
                                                 
2 In a relatively small sample, Hanson (2003) finds associated with higher levels of trade and FDI in cross 
section, were correlated with increase wages. 
   3
noted above, our specification allows disentangling relative expected earnings effects 
from the  liquidity effect and we find very significant and very intuitively plausible signs 
on labor market variables.  Finally, we introduce networking effects and find them also 
strongly significant. 
 
Second, we document that both FDI and trade variables are substitutes for labor 
flows, are likely to work through the labor market, and have substantial deterrent effects.  
Even without the application to international migration, this finding is of intrinsic interest 
in the context of the literature working at the nexus of national spatial income disparities 
and migration (Barro and Sala I Martin 1992, Gabriel, Shack-Marquez and Wascher 
1993, Esquivel 1997) and the literature on how trade liberalization may affect regional 
disparities (Hanson 1997, Aroca, Bosch, Maloney 2000).  However, by establishing that 
the mechanisms through which NAFTA was to impact migration indeed function at the 
domestic level, we offer support  for President Salinas’ claim for international migration 
as well. Further, we implicitly address Markusen’s concern that the skills demanded by 
FDI and trade are higher than those possessed by the majority of migrants to the US and 
hence that NAFTA may have no effect.  
 
Finally we generate some tentative “back of the envelope” inferences about the 
impact on Mexico-US migration treating the US implicitly as the 33
rd Mexican state. We 




We assume that the potential migrant faces j possible destinations where i is the 
region of origin and k is the migration region chosen. The worker internal migration 
decision is reflected by the sign of  the index function   
C V V I i k − − =
*  
 where V can be interpreted as an indirect utility function in the context of random utility 
theory (Domencich and McFadden, 1975 and Train, 1986),  and C is a measure of costs. 
We assume that utility is a function of a linear combination of location characteristics  X   4
 
  Vj = Xj β + εj   
If the destination region is more desirable, measured along several dimensions, and if the 
migrant has sufficient resources to move, then we should observe migration.  The 
probability that the indicator will be larger than zero is equal to the probability that the 
difference between V’s is greater than transport costs:  
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This specification nests many standard estimated functions (See Greenwood 1997) 
including Borjas’ (2001) where the only argument in the utility function is the wage.
 3  
The actual specification depends on the assumptions about the error term.   
 
  The   βs  may be allowed to vary and in fact the literature tends to find  a greater 
role for destination variable than for origin variables.  This may be because of   
asymmetric information about locales (Gabriel et.al 1993), or that the individual variables 
are correlated with omitted variables that may have a greater impact on one end of the 
migration move.   As an example that we discuss in more detail later, many variables 
could be correlated with unmeasured wealth or liquidity that would determine whether 
the worker has the savings to pay the fixed cost C of moving.   
 
The matrix  X  contains the variables capturing the relative expected incomes (Y) 
in the two areas (wages, unemployment, price indices), and the set of characteristics of 
the region (amenities) that may also affect the migration decision.  It is through Y that we 
might expect the impact of FDI and trade.   
 
                                                 
3 Borjas argues that  C w w I i j j − − = } { max
*  where I
* is an indicator variable,  w is the wage  y C  the 
costs of  transportation to the new locale.  This function must satisfy   } { max j
j
k w w = , where j represents 
all possible destinations, i the region of origin and  k the region chosen.   5
Since we work with aggregate data, we follow Berkson’s (1944) setup as 
elaborated by Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and generalized in Gourieroux (2000). Here 
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where F is the probability function that is determined by the structure of the errors.   
 
III.  Data 
 
Migration data: The 2000 census generates migration flows from a questions that asks in 
what state the interviewee resided 5 years ago.  Though this approach is standard in the 
literature, it has the drawback of obscuring migrants who may have left and returned in 
the five year period.  Flows to the US, are derived from a question asking whether during 
the last five years, a member of the household has gone to the US.  
 
Moving Costs: Following the literature (again, see Greenwood 1997), we approximate 
the costs of transportation as a quadratic function of distance.
4 This is a proxy for the 
costs of migration that consist of the moving costs themselves, the opportunity costs of 
moving which rise with the length of the journey, and rising communication costs with 
the family in the point of origin, including the increased costs of return visits.  In general, 
the literature expects a negative impact on migration but with decreasing effect.   
 
Networks: An emerging literature stresses the importance of existing networks as 
lowering transaction and information costs.  The Mexico-US literature has particularly 
expanded on this point (see, Zabin and Hughes 1995, Massey and Espinosa 1997, 
Winters, de Janvry and Sadoulet 2000, McKenzie and Ropoport 2004 among others). 
Following the literature on within country migration, we use the share of the population 
that had arrived in destination j more than 5 years ago that was born in state of origin i as 
a proxy.     
                                                 
4 Though we assume that the indirect utility function is linear and the weight of each variable is similar in 
each region, this assumption can be easy relaxed to differentiate the origin (o) and destination (d) 
parameters.     6
 
Population: is the population by state in 1995 as reported by the Census. As Greenwood 
(1997) summarizes, population is often used as a measure of the availability of public 
goods. However, it is also true that larger states offer more “connection points” than 
small states and will hence, in a random reallocation, attract more migrants. Shultz   
(1982) is also correct in arguing that larger states may have smaller rates of out migration 
simply by virtue of having more places to migrate to within.  The 1995 value is used to 
eliminate any problems of simultaneity with migration flows that happen in subsequent 
years.  
 
Labor Market Variables:   The unemployment and nominal wage variables are generated 
as the average of their quarterly values in 1995, 1996 and 1997 from the National Urban 
Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano- ENEU).  
 
Cost of Living: Though presumably the potential migrant should be focusing on real as 
opposed to nominal expected wages, the actual deflator used may not be that of the 
current place of work.  For instance, if a migrant plans to return to a low cost area to 
retire, he may generate real savings measured in his retirement destination faster by 
earning a lower real wage in a high cost area (See Lucas 1997 for a survey of this 
literature).  Further, high cost of living may point to a larger potential income over the 
long run even if not experienced even by the individual making the decision (Spencer 
1989, Pagano 1990). Certainly, in an intertemporal or intergenerational context, taking a 
lower real wage in the US is still likely to offer the migrant’s descendents far better 
options than would have been the case in Mexico.
5 
 
The existing price indexes for Mexican states do not allow to make comparisons 
of cost of living across states. For this reason we create two indices using the ending 
module of the National Survey of Household Income and Spending (ENIGH 1992/8 
                                                 
5 The literature provides mixed evidence. Cameron and Muellbauer (1997) studying UK migration find 
strong “deflator” effects that they argue dominate any expectation effects. On the other hand,  Thomas 
(1993), also looking at the UK, finds no impact of regional house price difference on destination choice of 
any group except retirees.   7
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares).  Since food is likely comprise a 
larger share of the consumption basket in LDCs,
6 we generate a Laspeyres Index of a 
consumption basket of 200 items where the price and basket of reference is the national 
average in 1992. The housing price index was created using hedonic prices for rented 
houses only and is analogous to those used in the industrial country literature. Housing 
characteristics include; number of rooms; kitchen; bathroom; electricity; telephone; water 
drainage and potable water; and type of walls, floors and ceilings and community size. 
Both indexes were included separately and as an average measure of the cost of living 
and were included free standing to allow for the effects described above.  The most 
satisfactory results gained with an average measure and these we report. 
 
Amenities:  Price indices, however, may also simply reflect amenities available in the 
new area, implying a positive relation with migration decisions. Further, as Roback 
(1982) showed, they affect equilibrium wages as well and hence should be included as 
part of the net utility change of moving from one region to another. A measure of 
amenities across Mexican states was created by the National Institute of Economic and 
Geographical Information using the 2000 General Census of Population and Housing.  
However, it includes measures of labor market tightness as well as migration 
variables(percentage of resident population who were born in other states and percentage 
residing in other states), variables whose influence we are trying to separate out.  We 
therefore create a new index incorporating information on the percentage of the 
population living in urban areas, mortality rates, health infrastructure (number of nurses 
per capita, doctors per capita, hospitals per capita, beds) education (students per teacher 
in primary, secondary schools), and infrastructure (percentage and education of houses 
with electricity and without water drainage). We identified four significant factor 
loadings with the first having the strongest interpretation as capturing amenities. The 
correlation with wages for this measure is 0.37, while the correlation with the INEGI’s 
welfare index is 0.77.  
 
                                                 
6 The ENIGH gives information on expenses for all items, but only unit price and quantity consumed  for 
food items.  Nevertheless the survey also includes House Characteristics which allow us to estimate also 
Housing.   8
Trade and Investment Variables 
 
Foreign Direct Investment: This is aggregate per capita foreign direct investment from 
1995-1999 reported to the government by the firms investing and was provided   by the 
Central Bank of Mexico.  The Federal District (DF- Mexico City) shows vastly higher 
rates because much of the FDI destined for other states is registered at the headquarters of 
the firm in the DF.  We include a dummy variable in the regressions to account for this 
measurement error.  As graph 2 suggests, FDI is highly, although not exclusively 
concentrated along the northern border with the US. 
 
Maquila Value Added: This variable may be seen purely as a proxy for FDI, but since the 
maquilas are primarily exporters, it can also be seen as a proxy for “maquila exports per 
capita” which brings it closer to being a trade variable. Since it is collected from 
industrial surveys, it does not suffer from the “headquarters” effect of the FDI variable. 
The two variables are moderately correlated (.64) and hence are it may be a serviceable 
proxy for FDI more generally. On the other hand, the government of Mexico tabulates 12 
of the states in an “other” category and the loss of these state implies reduced information 
and potential selection bias. We run the regressions with the substantially reduced 
sample. 
 
Exports: This variable is provided by the Ministry of Finance (Hacienda).  As with the 
FDI data, the exports reported by firm are assigned to the location of the headquarters, 
often in the DF, which may not be the actual location of production.  The MOF therefore 
re-assigns the firm’s aggregate exports proportionally using data on the location of plants 
and employees of each firm found in the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) 
data base.  The methodology does not include oil or electricity exports and may miss 
smaller firms which do not register with IMSS.   
 
Imports:  This variable could have multiple and conflicting effects.  It could simply 
reflect the degree of integration of a state with external economies and hence proxy as 
well for exports.  On the other hand, if it is seen as representing competition for import   9
substituting firms, the short run labor market impact could be negative and hence it could 
conceivably lead to more migration.  Provided by Bancomex.    
 
None of the variables are ideal, but they are complementary in the sense of being 
strong whether the other is weak.  Together, we may get a reliable picture of the impact 
of trade/investment variables.  
 
 
IV. Results  
 
In preliminary regressions, we estimated a multinomial logit model for aggregate 
data. Though the results were plausible, the Fry and Harris test (1998) suggested that the 
data violate the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Therefore, we estimate a 
multinomial probit and follow Gourieroux’s (2000) weighted least square procedure. 
 
Column 1a and lb (Table 2), present the standard regression including the labor 
market variables.  Across the next columns, the various FDI and trade variables are 
added.  Overall, the specifications are very satisfactory with the coefficients on the core 
variables generally statistically significant and of predicted sign.  The costs of movement 
measures –distance and network- are significant in all specifications and, in the former 
case are well within the usual range found in the literature (Greenwood 1997, see also 
Gabriel et al 1996, Fields 1982, and Schultz, 1982).  The population of the destination 
enters significantly and of positive sign in all specifications, consistent with either a 
“connection point” interpretation or a residuals amenity effect.  The coefficient on the 
origin is unstable across specifications.   
  
  The cost of living variable enters very significantly and of important magnitude in 
the sector of origin. The strong positive coefficient on the destination is unexpected, 
although perhaps consistent with the view of cost of living being a measure of 
expectations for future income growth as discussed earlier.  There appears to be some 
interaction between the amenities and networking variables.  In the absence of the latter,   10
the amenities variable enters with predicted signs, but again in the relative/free standing 
format that suggests that amenities may be correlated with an omitted credit constraint 
variable.  Including networking reduces the significance of the relative amenities term in 
virtually all specifications.  The reason is not clear although it may be that the cumulative 
migration from origin to destination of the past that is the networking term is especially 
related to the relative amenities levels.  
 
Labor Market Variables 
 
  Preliminary estimations of 1a and 1b found both the origin unemployment and 
wage level to be insignificant as has been found frequently in the literature (Greenwood 
1997, Lucas 1997).  However, we then attempted to isolate two countervailing effects, 
one a substitution effect among states, and the other a wealth or liquidity effect that 
allows the worker to cover the fixed cost of moving. The latter effect has been found for 
unemployment by Goss and Schoening (1984) and Herzog et al. (1993) for the US who 
find that the probability of moving decreases with the duration of unemployment. The 
literature on the wage effect is also extensive (See Stark and Taylor 1991 for a discussion 
of credit constraints).  We generate relative wage (ln wj-ln wi) and relative 
unemployment (Uj/Ui) variables to capture substitution effects and then allow free 
standing initial wage and unemployment variables to capture credit constraint effects.  In 
the complete sample, all but the free standing unemployment term enter significantly 
although it is of predicted sign and significant at the 10% level in the restricted 
regression.  This overall strong performance suggests that the poor results of home labor 





  Columns 2a, 3a, 4a and 5a drop the labor force variables and replace them with 
the trade and investment variables.  In all cases, we find evidence of a strong substitution 
effect: FDI and trade reduce migration.  A free standing term was significant in half the   11
cases suggesting again, a liquidity/wealth effect so the results are again reported in the 
constrained/free standing form.  In the case of maquilas and imports, it appears that this 
liquidity effect offsets to some extent the substitution effect found in the relative term.   
 
Columns 2b, 3b, 4b, and 5b add the labor force variables and suggest that some, 
but not all of the effect of the trade and investment variables works through the labor 
market.  The substitution effect diminishes by at least a factor of 2 in most cases and in 
the case of FDI becomes insignificant.  The exception is the maquila variable, which 
appears to strengthen.  Whether this is due to the selection bias caused by the authorities 
grouping  states with small maquila presence is not clear.   
 
The free standing terms trade and investment variables also show propensity to 
flip sign in all cases suggesting that they were capturing the initial wealth/liquidity now 
captured by initial wages and unemployment.  Minus this effect the trade and investment 
variables have a more powerful deterrent effect than destination an attractive effect.  The 
fact that all relative trade and investment variables retain an effect outside of the 
contemporaneous labor market variables may reflect that there is an independent 
disincentive effect to migrate, perhaps through expectations of future growth.  In all 
cases, the possible endogeneity between local labor market variables and the location of 
trade/FDI is left largely unexplored due to lack of credible instruments.  Hence, we treat 
the results as suggestive that part of the impact of these variables on migration works 
through the labor market.  
 
As an example of the implied magnitudes, figure 3a presents the calculated 
elasticities with response to an increase in FDI by state for both the reduction in “push” 
or out migration from the state and increase in “pull” from the other states.  Though in 
theory, the liquidity effect identified in the maquila and export cases could dominate and 
cause an increase in “push,” migration in the FDI case the coefficient is small and 
insignificant, and push is clearly reduced from all states with elasticities averaging .02.  
Pull elasticities are substantially higher averaging around .05 but reaching .1 in the case   12
of Colima, Zacatecas and Campeche. A doubling of FDI in these states leads to a 10% 
increase in migrants attracted to the state and a 2% decline in outflows. 
 
To see whether these magnitudes are important, figure 3b calculates the impact of 
a 10% rise in each states’ FDI on the magnitude of push and pull migration divided, as a 
measure of scale, by total out migration to both the US and other Mexican states.  What is 
clear is that both effects are of non –trivial magnitude.  The reduction in push migration 
lies between 1-3% of total migration while pull migration can range from under .5% to 
again over 10% in the three countries mentioned above.  Inflows of FDI potentially have 
substantial impact as a mechanism for affecting migratory flows.  
 
Further, addressing Markusen’s concern, it does not seem to be the case that the 
internal migrant population is so significantly distinct from that migrating the to the US?  
Table 3 tabulates the educational attainment, age and gender of non-movers in Mexico 
and within Mexico migrants tabulated from the Mexican census, and that of recent 
migrants to the US as tabulated by the US census.
7  Men have similar age profiles 
although women tend to be somewhat older when they migrate to the US, perhaps 
reflecting a delayed migration after their spouses.  For both genders, however, what 
emerges is that, though not radically different, the domestic migrants are somewhat less 
educated than those internationally.  Markusen’s concern that FDI and trade would not 
prove a disincentive to migration because it did not affect the relevant migratory 
population seems unfounded.   
 
Simulations of US impact 
 
Ideally, we could use the estimates above to offer some guess at the magnitude of 
the impact on US migration.  Clearly, for such an exercise to be relevant, it must be the 
case that the decision to migrate to the US, or alternatively, the types of people who 
decide to migrate to the US do not differ too much between the two destinations.  As 
noted above, table 3 suggests that the demographics of the two groups are similar, and the 
                                                 
7 These findings are very similar to those of Chiquiar and Hanson (2003) using the US census.   13
literature is mixed although not necessarily inconsistent with this assumption.
8 It does 
appear, however, that relative to men, women are more likely to migrate within Mexico, 
than to the US.  This may reflect the strategy of households that migrate to the border to 
send the husband across to engage in the riskier and more intensive work while the wife 
stays in the less risky, less demanding Mexican-side jobs that permit easier balancing of 
family responsibilities (Zabin and Hughes 1995).   The literature does stress the 
importance of accumulated networking that appears to have caused some Mexican states 
to generate a disproportionate number of US bound migrants.  To the degree possible, we 
controlled for such effects in the domestic regressions and, as detailed below, make 
additional adjustments in the simulations.   
 
A second concern is whether the US variables are too “out of sample” to really 
treat the US as a “33
rd Mexican State.”  In fact, as table 4 shows, ratio of the per capita 
income of Mexico’s richest state, the D.F. relative to its poorest is about 6.4 in nominal or 
5.6 in real terms while the ratio of the average for the US relative to the D.F. is only 
about 1.9 or 1.5 PPP adjusted. That is, in terms of development the US is closer to 
Mexico City than Mexico City is to Chiapas.  Nor are wage differentials radically 
different.  The ratio of the Hispanic real wage in the US to the mean wage of the DF 
adjusted for PPP is roughly the same as the ratio of the real DF wage to that in Chiapas.    
 
  There may be some concern about the importance of the border representing 
fundamentally different “transport costs.” In fact, the evidence is strong that this is more 
a difference in magnitude than kind.  Donato, Durand and Massey (1992) argue that “our 
data from Mexico reveal a fairly high probability of apprehension by INS combined with 
                                                 
8 Rivera-Batiz (1986) in an often cited article implicitly suggests that migrants’ indifference between 
destinations:  “The impact of the maquiladoras on migration to the United States is dependent on whether 
they are able to raise employment by more than they increase the labor supply in the border areas through 
induced migration from southern regions.  If an excess supply of labor is generated at the border with 
surplus workers becoming either openly unemployed or underemployed, it is likely that there will be a 
spillover into illegal migration to the United States” (p. 265).  The field work on “staged migration” can be 
read both ways.  On the one hand, workers in the first stage, for instance, moving from Oaxaca to take jobs 
in Baja California have less information, contacts and coyote capital than when they decide to make a 
second stage crossing to the US. On the other hand, the underlying objective function of that individual is 
arguably the same and both migration costs (embodied in information or networks) and credit constraints 
are standard in the migration specifications. . See Durand and Massey (1992) for a review of the field 
literature on migration and Cornelius and Martin (1993) and Zabin and Hughes (1995)   14
a near-certain probability of ultimately entering the United States.”(p 152) and that 
“every migrant who attempted a border crossing, whether apprehended or not, eventually 
gained entry” p 155 italics theirs.  This suggests that border control serves more as a tariff 
than a quota. 
 
The costs of movement are substantially different, but perhaps not so much as we 
might think at first look.  The present (2002) cost of a second class bus from Quintana 
Roo to Coahuila, one of longer trips in our sample, was roughly $US100 compared to 
very little between Mexico State and DF.
9  Anecdotal evidence about the cost of direct 
transport across the border in the 1980s was $150 (244 $US 2002; Conover 1987 cited in 
Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999), again, not so far out of sample.
10  The cost of a Coyote or 
smuggler/guide appears to have held steady in real terms since the 1960s at around $350 
($2075 $US2002; Donato, Durand and Massey 1992) 
11 although Crane et al (1990 cited 
in Hanson and Spillimbergo 1999) suggest that in 1993 only 8.3 percent of those 
apprehended by the INS had employed one. 
 
  Despite the differences that there are, the overall magnitudes of migration to the 
US vs to other states are not “too different.”  Of total migration, roughly 2/3 is internal 
and 1/3 is to the US.  As a very crude first approximation, even if we make no 
adjustments for any likely covariates such as distance or relative wages, a simple χ
2 
statistic suggested by Bickenbach and Bode (2003) cannot reject that the same Markov 
process is driving both US and intra Mexican migration for 12 out of the 32 states.
12  
 
To generate our “back of the envelope” calculations, we first note that total 
emigration from any state is the sum of migration to other states plus the US:  
 
                                                 
9 White Star Bus line 
10 Inflated from 1985 figure with CPI. 
11 This showed little change with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 suggesting that it is a 
fairly robust number. Figure was reached by inflating the 1960 figure by the CPI.  Coyotes only get paid for 
successful crossings. 
12 These results do rely on dropping Mexico state and the Federal district since they are effectively the same 
unit and have very high flows between them.    15
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where MUS  is the total migration from México to the US. From above, we know that the 
probability of migrating from state i to state j depends on the characteristics in 
X, () ij p Xβ =Φ  and hence that  
1 ˆ () ij ij p zX b
− Φ= = .  The percentage change in 
immigration to the US we can obtain as: 
 
             





























            for k = {i, j} 
 
The first term of this elasticity captures the substitution effect-how much the existing 
flows of migrants will be reallocated among destinations given the change in Xk..  The 
second term captures the aggregate percentage change in total migration    This 
component we cannot capture from our domestic data.  Given the liquidity effect detected 
earlier, it has the potential to be positive. However, the liquidity effect was non-
significant in the FDI regressions and for no state did we find that out migration 
increased with respect to FDI.   Thus, we consider the effects generated by the first term 
to offer a “lower bound” of the total effect on US migration.  
 
The estimator used in the previous sector weighted all states equally beyond the 
necessary correction for heteroskedasticity brought on in the binomial context by 
differential state sizes (Domencich and McFadden, 1975). This is not necessarily the case 
when we want to estimate the function implicitly including the US as the 33
rd state:   16
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Clearly, we lack the determinants of  iUSA P ˆ , but we do have information on which states 
send more migrants to the US, particularly those with long established networks, which 














 where the first term, a function of the share of each state that migrates 
to the US become the weight of the estimated function.  In practice, the estimates differed 
some, but not greatly from those previous.  
 
  Figure 4 presents the elasticity of migration to the US with respect to FDI above 
the axis and below the axis, the impact of an investment of $US100 million on the 
number of people who migrate.  The elasticities are quite low- on average a doubling of 
FDI would lead only to a 1.5-2% reduction in migration. Further, for many states the 
impact of a single $US100 million plant  opening decreases migration little.  However in 
some areas, such as Veracruz, where there is little FDI and a substantial amount of 
migration, the decline in outflows is substantial, in the first case  approaching 4,000 
people.  Again, these are intended as back of the envelope calculations that rely heavily 
on the assumption that the US is considered broadly as 32
rd destination for a migrant 
leaving his state.   And again, we are only capturing the impact of redirection of existing 
migration to other Mexican states, not the overall decline in migration so these must be 





This paper evaluated the mechanisms through which NAFTA related variables 
might work to reduce migration to the US using data from within Mexico.  We make 
three contributions to both the literature on migration more generally, and  the impact of 
trade and FDI flows on migration.    17
 
First, we offer the first estimates of determinants of migration flows within 
Mexico and make some advances in the LDC migration literature.  In line with recent 
innovations in the industrialized country literature, we generate proxies for both the level 
of amenities, costs of living and networks and generally find significance.  Contrary to 
much of the literature, our specification generates intuitive and significant signs on home 
state labor market variables: a rise in home earnings or employment levels does deter 
migration.  We argue that part of the traditional poor performance of the origin state 
variables is that they capture a mix of deterrent effects, and credit constraints.   
 
Second, we document that FDI, maquila value added, exports, and imports are 
substitutes for labor flows, appear to at least partly work through the labor market, and 
that the effects are of important magnitude.  Further, though there is evidence that greater 
investment or trade may release credit constraints and increase migration, in the case we 
examine, FDI, the effect does not dominate. Finally we generate some tentative 
inferences about the impact on Mexico-US migration treating the US implicitly as the 
33
rd Mexican state.      18
References: 
 
Aroca, Patricio, Mariano Bosch and William F. Maloney. 2002. “Is NAFTA Polarizing 
México? or Existe También el Sur? Spatial Dimensions of Mexico’s Post-Liberalization 
Growth.” Mimeographed. Office of the Chief Economist for LCR,  The World Bank 
 
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1992. “Regional Growth and Migration: A 
Japan-United States Comparison.” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 
6: 312-46.  
 
Ben-Akiva, M. and S.R. Lerman. 1985. Discrete Choice Analysis. Theory and 
Application to Travel Demand. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
Beyer, H., P. Rojas and R. Vergara. 1999. “Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality.” 
Journal of Development Economics 59: 103-123. 
 
Bickenbach, F. and E. Bode (2003) “Evaluating the Markov Property in Studies of 
Economic Convergence” International Regional Science Review 16:363-392 
 
Borjas, George. 2001. “Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market?.” 
Brooking Panel on Economics Activity, March 29-30.  
 
Borjas, George. 1994. “The Economics of Immigration.” Journal of Economic Literature 
32: 1667-717. 
 
Cameron, Gavin, and John Muellbauer. 1998. “The Housing Market and Regional 
Commuting and Migration Choices.” Discussion Paper 1945. Center for Economic Policy 
Research. London, UK.  
 
Chiqiar, Daniel and Gordon H. Hanson. 2003. “International Migration, Self-Selection, 
and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States.” NBER 
working paper 9242. Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
Conover, Ted. 1987. Coyotes: A Journey through the Secret World of America’s Illegal 
Aliens. Vintage New York, NY, USA.  
 
Cornelius, Wayne A. and Philip L. Martin. 1993. “The Uncertain Connection: Free Trade 
and Rural Mexican Migration to the United States.” International Migration 
Review.27(3): 484-512. 
 
Crane, Keith, Beth J. Asch, Joanna Z. Heilbrunn, and Danielle C. Cullinane. 1990. “The 
Effect of Employer Sanctions on the Flow of Undocumented Immigrants to the United 
States.” Urban Institute Report No. 90-8. Washington, DC, USA. 
   19
Davila, Alberto and Rogelio Saenz. 1990. “The Effect of Maquiladora Employment on 
the Monthly Flow of Mexican Undocumented Immigration to the U.S., 1978-1982.” 
International Migration Review 24(1): 96-107. 
 
Davies, P.S., M.J. Greenwood and H. Li. 2001. “A Conditional Logit Approach to U.S. 
State-To-State Migration.” Journal of Regional Science 41(2): 337-360. 
 
Domencich, T.A., and D. McFadden. 1975. Urban Travel Demand. A Behavioral 
Analysis. North Holland Publishing Co., NY, USA. 
 
Donato, Katharine M., Jorge Druand and Douglas S. Massey. 1992. “Stemming the Tide? 
Assessing the Deterrent Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act.” 
Demography 29: 139-157. 
 
Durand, Jorge and Douglas S. Massey. 1992. “Mexican Migration to the United States: A 
Critical Review.”  Latin American Research Review 27(2): 3-42. 
 
Esquivel, Gerardo Hernandez. 1997. “Essays on Convergence, Migration and Growth.” 
Unpublished PhD. Dissertation. MIT, MA, USA. 
 
Faini, R., J-M. Grether and J. De Melo. 1999. “Globalization, and migratory pressures 
from developing countries: a simulation analysis.” In Faini, R., J. De Melo and K. F. 
Zimmermann, eds. Migration. The Controversies and the Evidence. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Feenstra, R.C. and G.H. Hanson. 1995. “Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages: 
Evidence from Mexico’s Maquiladoras.” NBER working paper 5122. Cambridge, MA, 
USA. 
 
Field, G.. 1982. “Place-to-Place Migration in Colombia.” Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 31: 538-558. 
 
Fry, T.R.L. and M.N. Harris (1998). “Testing for Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives. Some Empirical Results.” Sociological Methods & Research 26(3): 401-
423. 
 
Gabriel, S.A., J. Shack-Marquez and W.L. Wascher. 1996. “Does Migration Arbitrage 
Regional Labor Market Differentials?” Regional Science and Urban Economics 23: 211-
233. 
 
Goss, E. P and N.C. Schoening. 1984. “Search time, Unemployment and the Migration 
Decision.” Journal of Human Resources 19: 570-579. 
 
Gourieroux, Christian. 2000. Econometrics of Qualitative Dependent Variables. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
   20
Greenwood, M. J.. 1997. “Internal Migration in Developed Countries.” In Rosenzweig 
and Stark Eds. Handbook of Families and Population Economics. North-Holland 
Publisher, Amsterdam. Holland. 
 
Hanson, Gordon and Christopher Woodruff. 2003. “Emigration and Educational 
Attainment in Mexico.” Mimeographed. University of California at San Diego, CA, 
USA. 
 
Hanson, Gordon. 1997. “Increasing Returns, Trade, and the Regional Structure of 
Wages.” Economic Journal 107: 113-133. 
 
Hanson, Gordon and Antonio Spillembergo. 1999. “Illegal Immigration, Border 
Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico 
Border.” American Economic Review 89: 1337-1357. 
 
Herzog, H.W. Jr., A.M. Schlottmann and T.P. Boehm. 1993. “Migration as Spatial Job 
Search: A Survey of Empirical Findings.” Regional Studies 27: 605-620.  
 
Jones, Richard C. 2001. “Maquiladoras and U. S.-Bound Migration in Central Mexico.” 
Growth and Change 32: 193-216. 
 
Leonard, J.S. and R. McCulloch. 1991. “Foreign-Owned Businesses in the United State.” 
In J.M. Abowd and R.B. Freeman, eds. Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market. 
NBER Project Report, The University of Chicago Press, IL, USA. 
 
Lucas, R.E.B. 1997. “Internal Migration in Developing Countries,” In Rosenzweig and 
Stark, eds. Handbook of Families and Population Economics. North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
 
Markusen, J.R. and S. Zahniser. 1999. “Liberalization and incentives for labor migration: 
theory with applications to NAFTA.” In R. Faini, J. De Melo and K.F. Zimmermann, eds. 
Migration. The Controversies and the Evidence. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
 
Markusen, J.R. and A.J. Venables. 1997. “The Role of the Multinational Firm in the 
Wage-Gap Debate.” Review of International Economics 5: 435-51. 
 
Massey, Douglas S. and Kristin E. Espinosa. 1997. “What’s Driving Mexico-U.S. 
Migration? A theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis.” The American Journal of 
Sociology 102(4): 939-999. 
 
McKenzie, David and Hillel Rapoport. 2004. “Network Effects and the Dynamics of 
Migration and Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico.” SCID working paper 201. 
Stanford, CA, USA. 
   21
Pagano, M.. 1990. “Discussion of Muellbauer and Murphy (1990) “Is the Balance of 
Payments Sustainable?” Economic Policy 5(2): 387-390.  
 
Pudney, S.. 1989. Modeling Individual Choice. The Econometrics of Corners, Kinks and 
Holes. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK. 
 
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L.. 1986. “Can Border Industries Be a Substitute for 
Immigration?” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-
Eight Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association 76(2): 263-268. 
 
Roback, Jennifer. 1982. “Wages, Rents and the Quality of Life.” Journal of Political 
Economy 6: 1257-1278. 
 
Sjaastad, Larry A. 1962. “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration.” Journal of 
Political Economy 70: 80-93. 
 
Shultz, T.P.. 1982. “Lifetime Migration Within Educational Strata in Venezuela: 
Estimates of a Logistic Model.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 31: 559-
593. 
 
Spencer, P.D.. 1989. “Comments on Bover et al.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics 51: 153-157.  
 
Stark, Oded, and J. Edward Taylor. 1991. “Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The 
Role of Relative Deprivation.” The Economic Journal 101: 1163-1178. 
 
Thomas, Alun. 1993. “The Influence of Wages and House Prices on British Interregional 
Migration Decisions.” Applied Economics 25: 1261-1268. 
 
Train, Kenneth. 1986. Qualitative Choice Analysis. Theory, Econometrics, and an 
Application to the Automobile Demand. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
Vanderkamp, J.. 1971. “Migration Flows, their Determinants and the Effects of Return 
Migration.” Journal of Political Economy 79: 1012-1031. 
 
Zabin, Carol and Sallie Huges. 1995. “Economic Integration and Labor Flows: Stage 
Migration in Farm Labor Markets in Mexico and the United States.”  International 


























Per Capita FDI  (From 1994 to 2000)
Millions of Dollars






















   23

















































































































  Figure 3b: Estimated Impact on Push and Pull Migration of a 10% rise in FDI as a 
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  Figure 4: Elasticity Migration to US wrt FDI and Migration Response of a $US100 Million 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Data       
   Obs. Mean  St.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Emigrants from i to j  992  3,890  17,208  16  470,693 
Population 992  2,848,697  2,440,552  375,494  11,170,796 
Distance  992  19.27  12.42 1 64.88 
Distance sq.  992  525.98  660.95  1.00  4209.00 
Prices 992  100.00  16.55  66.99  138.15 
log  Prices  992  4.59  0.16 4.20 4.93 
Unemployment 992  2.99  1.04 1.46 6.64 
Nominal wages  992  1787  345  1208  3036 
log  Nominal  wages  992  7.47  0.18 7.07 8.01 
Amenities  992  2.11  1.00 0.10 4.72 
FDI 992  268.00  386.00  0.04  1617.00 
log FDI  992  4.35  2.15  -3.11  7.38 
Exports  992  1452  2130 19.82 8578 
log  Exports  992  6.14  1.69 2.98 9.05 
Imports 992  844  1219  5.52  4176 
log  Imports  992  5.51  1.84 1.7084 8.33 
Maquila 306  97,681  129,480  1,029  453,211 
log Maquila  306  10.57  1.51  6.93  13.02 
 
   26
 
Table 2: Determinants of Migration                         
   Basic  Reduced  FDI  Maquila  Exports  Imports 
      sample        (reduced sample)             
   1a  1b  2a  2b  3a  3b  4a  4b  5a  5b 
                                
Distance  -0.039  -0.0553  -0.037  -0.0421  -0.0581  -0.0564  -0.0359  -0.0399  -0.0345  -0.0389 
   (15.61)  (10.38)  (13.99)  (16.97)  (10.53)  (10.94)  (14.11)  (16.45)  (13.77)  (15.99) 
Distance sq.  0.0005  0.0007  0.0005  0.0005  0.0008  0.0008  0.0005  0.0005  0.0004  0.0005 
   (8.92)  (6.12)  (9.04)  (9.81)  (6.85)  (6.63)  (8.49)  (9.24)  (8.30)  (9.16) 
Networks  0.004  0.0045  0.0034  0.0041  0.0042  0.0042  0.0037  0.0035  0.0041  0.0039 
   (12.58)  (9.78)  (9.64)  (12.67)  (8.68)  (9.43)  (11.12)  (11.19)  (12.55)  (12.60) 
Population i   -0.0014  -0.0175  0.0034  -0.0086  -0.0268  -0.0141  0.0055  0.0085  0.0087  0.0111 
   (0.33)  (2.08)  (0.71)  (1.92)  (3.26)  (1.72)  (1.24)  (1.91)  (1.96)  (2.41) 
Population j  0.0456  0.0286  0.0473  0.0384  0.0224  0.035  0.0415  0.0492  0.0366  0.0436 
   (9.61)  (3.12)  (9.18)  (7.95)  (2.39)  (3.91)  (8.41)  (10.38)  (7.55)  (9.13) 
Log. prices i   0.3079  0.0905  0.2764  0.3374  0.4605  -0.125  0.2079  0.1563  0.2356  0.1697 
   (3.45)  (0.55)  (3.21)  (3.84)  (3.67)  (0.73)  (2.65)  (1.74)  (3.05)  (1.88) 
Log. prices j  0.2843  0.1632  0.7152  0.2582  0.9122  0.1718  0.7792  0.3036  0.6542  0.3045 
   (3.71)  (1.10)  (9.89)  (3.45)  (7.95)  (1.14)  (11.68)  (3.98)  (9.72)  (4.04) 
Relative Amenities  0.003  -0.0277  0.0019  -0.0013  0.0038  -0.0096  -0.0005  -0.0029  0.0004  -0.0013 
   (1.47)  (0.93)  (0.83)  (0.62)  (0.13)  (0.33)  (0.24)  (1.38)  (0.17)  (0.62) 
Amenities i   0.0225  -0.0155  0.0471  0.0211  -0.0005  -0.0214  0.0459  0.0368  0.0654  0.0533 
   (1.91)  (0.64)  (4.04)  (1.82)  (0.02)  (0.90)  (3.82)  (3.16)  (5.15)  (4.35) 
Labor market                               
Relative unemp.  -0.1161  -0.1506     -0.1391     -0.1454     -0.1097     -0.1212 
   (4.20)  (2.17)     (5.12)     (2.16)     (4.10)     (4.51) 
Unemployment i   -0.0335  -0.134     -0.0609     -0.136     -0.0322     -0.0205 
   (2.21)  (3.10)     (3.99)     (3.24)     (2.21)     (1.38) 
Relative nominal wage  0.8025  1.0515     0.8902     0.8513     0.753     0.6188 
   (12.46)  (8.22)     (12.00)     (5.56)     (10.02)     (7.65) 
Log. nominal wage i   0.6903  1.2762     1.044     1.5221     1.012     0.899 
   (6.72)  (6.05)     (8.98)     (6.08)     (8.29)     (7.02) 
                                
Investment and trade                               
Relative FDI/Maquila/ Exports/ 
Imports                             0.0291  -0.0091  0.0293  0.0535  0.0614  0.0195  0.0673  0.0309 
 (log Zj-log Zi)        (6.40)  (1.81)  (2.51)  (4.00)  (10.27)  (2.88)  (11.83)  (4.40) 
Log. of FDI i/Maquila i/ 
Exports i/Imports I        0.0085  -0.0407  0.0447  -0.0236  0.0136  -0.0458  0.0174  -0.033 
(log Zi)        (1.36)  (5.78)  (2.51)  (1.17)  (1.50)  (4.31)  (1.96)  (3.02) 
DF and Mexico State  -0.2147  0.0119  -0.266  -0.1219  -0.099  -0.0247  -0.2531  -0.2558  -0.2664  -0.2382 
   (5.26)  (0.16)  (6.02)  (2.85)  (1.29)  (0.33)  (6.05)  (6.39)  (6.54)  (6.03) 
Constant  -10.3586  -12.6053  -7.3816  -12.6744  -9.0691  -13.2986  -7.4026  -11.9351  -7.0175  -11.315 
   (13.94)  (9.56)  (14.23)  (15.64)  (11.73)  (9.86)  (14.94)  (15.31)  (14.45)  (13.83) 
                                
Observations  992  306  992  992  306  306  992  992  992  992 
R-squared  0.7  0.84  0.66  0.72  0.83  0.85  0.68  0.72  0.69  0.72 
                                
Estimates: Least squares weighted by group (gprobit).  Column 1a presents the base regression for all states and 1b presents the results with a 
reduced sample of states with data on maquila value added.  Columns 2a,3a, 4a and 5a present the results without labor market variables, but 
including  FDI, maquila value added, exports, and imports respectively.  Each variable is included as a relative measure ( the log of X in 
destination state “j”  over X in origin state  “i” and free standing log Xi. 2b,3b,3b, and 5b add the labor market variables.  Imports and FDI 
statistics were provided by the Central Bank of Mexico. The Maquilas Value Added is based on Banco de Datos division of the INEGI statistics 
(http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/bdine/bancos.htm). Exports was provided by the Ministry of Finance (Hacienda). 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses                           27 
 
Table 3: Migration Patterns by Education and Age         
              
      Males  Females  Total 
  
  

























S c h o o l i n g   ( % )                   
 No  schooling  14.1 10.5  8.0  16.0 11.0 9.6 15.1  10.7 8.6 
  1 to 4   27.9 19.7  5.3  26.8 19.5 5.6 27.3  19.6 5.4 
  5 to 8   28.9 25.5 32.1 29.2 28.2 29.6 29.1 26.9 31.1 
 9  12.9 16.4 12.4 12.3 16.6 11.3 12.6 16.5 11.9 
  10 to 11   4.0 5.1 7.3 3.9 5.2 6.2 3.9 5.1 6.9 
  less than 12  87.8 77.2 65.1 88.2 80.5 62.2 88.0 78.9 64.0 
 12  5.2 8.7  24.6  6.0 9.5 24.8 5.6  9.1 24.7 
  13 to 15   2.4 4.2 6.1 2.4 3.7 7.4 2.4 3.9 6.6 
  more than 15   4.6 9.9 4.2 3.4 6.3 5.6 4.0 8.0 4.7 
Age  31.2 28.6 28.3 32.2 27.8 30.7 31.7 28.2 29.2 
N  4,008,334   159,712   694,206   4,288,508  172,192   461,990   8,296,842   331,904   1,156,196 
             
Source: For migrants to the US, the 2000 US Census and within Mexico, the 2000 Mexican Census.    28 
 
Table 4: Monthly wages and GDP per capita, Mexico and United States 
         Mexico  US 
    
    
        
Current $us  PPP adjusted by 
State CPI  Current $us 
        
GDP per capita       
        
Average     5,393  8,349  29,451 
Min.     2,368  3,617  20,856 
Max.      15,226 20,268 40,870 
Max./Min.      6.4 5.6 2.0 
Average US/Max. Mexico  1.9  1.5   
         
         
Monthly wage       
         
Average     372  575  1,716 
Min.     218  375   
Max.     551  825   
Max./Min.     2.5  2.2   
Average US/Max. Mexico  3.1  2.1   
Notes (1) INEGI; (2) Author's estimation for male urban workers using ENEU (3) Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (http://www.bea.doc.gov); (4) Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat37.pdf) 
median earnings of Hispanic origin workers. 